In an open global financial system with large current account imbalances, national growth models are heavily conditioned by cross-border capital flows. The problem is that this conditioning is essentially invisible most of the time. The importance of capital inflows (or outflows) for domestic economic development becomes tangible only once those flows stop, reverse, or change composition, because such changes can force households, firms, and governments to adjust their borrowing and spending, leading to a re-balancing of the growth model.
In a new working paper co-authored with Lucio Baccaro and Joshua Cova, we have spelled out these international financial foundations of imbalanced growth (Braun et al. 2026). Building on the work of, among others, Schwartz (2009) and Klein and Pettis (2020), we present an argument with symmetrical implications for CA deficit and CA surplus countries: Any country with an export-led growth model and a persistent current account surplus needs to constantly acquire foreign financial assets. By contrast, any country with a consumption-led growth model and a persistent current account deficit needs to constantly sell financial assets to the rest of the world. In the paper, we show that this applies beyond the United States: Sustaining current account deficits for decades is not straightforward if you’re not the global financial hegemon, but lesser economies can still pull it off. The price chronic current account deficit countries such as Australia or the United Kingdom pay is the financialization of their economies—they have to produce attractive financial assets for foreign institutional investors.
The financing mix of US hegemony
The United States is the extreme case here, having sustained the world’s largest current account deficit for almost half a century. A country’s current account deficit must be financed by borrowing from the rest of the world—no wiggle room there. However, this leaves open what we may call the “financing mix”. Over time, the forms of borrowing through which the US has sustained its long-running current account deficit have changed significantly. This financing mix has evolved through at least three major arrangements.
The first arrangement was modest in scale—global imbalances were minuscule through the 1960s and remained small during the 1970—and could therefore be sustained direct state-to-state diplomacy backed, by military power. As Ho-fung Hung (2026) is arguing in an excellent new book, the “greenback empire” was built by military means: At key critical junctures during the postwar decades, US security and financial diplomacy cajoled the governments under its security umbrella to re-invest US dollar revenues derived from hosting US military bases and/or from petrochemical exports in US government securities.
The second arrangement had to sustain vastly greater global imbalances. Starting in the late 1990s, imbalances were supercharged by unrelenting demand from the US for manufactured goods from East Asia, and by equally unrelenting demand from those exporters for US government debt. This arrangement came into its own after the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. East Asian governments—above all, China—began to soak up their export industries’ US dollars to acquire vast official reserve portfolios of US government debt, in part for insurance purposes, in part to keep their exchange rates undervalued. Under what Dooley et al. (2004) dubbed the “revised Bretton Woods system”, the United States became the issuer of the world’s “safe asset” for which demand seemed, for all practical purposes, unlimited.
This Bretton Woods 2.0 arrangement crumbled after the global financial crisis. The 2010s, warped by quantitative easing, had no discernible institutional arrangement, resulting in an erratic, volatile financing mix. Only with the massive AI boom in the stock market has the financing mix through which the US sustains its current account deficit shifted decisively—this time to corporate equity. Brad Setser (2026) has dubbed this the “de-reservification” of US financial hegemony—the dollar’s reserve currency function is in decline relative to what Adam Tooze (2026) has dubbed the “profit dollar”.
A closer look at the data
With each annual current account deficit, the US adds to its negative net international investment position:
\(\text{Net international investment position} = \text{foreign assets} - \text{foreign liabilities}\)
These three variables are depicted in Figure 1. The solid black line shows that over the past two decades, the US has built up a negative net international investment position equivalent to 70% of annual GDP.
To understand the political economy of the United States’ evolving financing mix, we need to slice and dice it three ways: by debtor sector, by financial instrument, and by creditor geography. On all three dimensions, we are in the middle of a major regime shift.
In the past, US foreign liabilities consisted primarily of US government bonds—the pink segment in the bottom part of Figure 1 above. During the 2000s and 2010s, low-yielding US government bonds were the dominant asset in the rest of the world’s US portfolios. Official foreign reserve managers accumulated large quantities of US government bonds for insurance purposes; while US financial and non-financial companies held high-yielding FDI and equity assets (the grey and green segments in the upper half of Figure 1.)
In recent years, for a variety of reasons, official reserve accumulation has stagnated. China, Japan, and other exporters have stopped accumulating US Treasuries. At the same time, the growth of institutional capital pools in the rest of the world—above all, pension funds and sovereign wealth funds—has increased global demand for high-yielding US corporate equity. This shift in the external financing mix of the United States is displayed in Figure 2, which plots net financial flows by asset/liability category. A positive bar represents a net increase in foreign claims on the US in that category and quarter; a negative bar represents a net increase in US claims on the rest of the world. In the 2000s, official foreign reserve buying of US government and agency bonds was the main source of current account deficit financing. The contribution of official bond buying tapered off gradually and turned negative in 2015, at the peak of the ZIRP period, and has been marginal ever since.
Foreign official demand for US government debt was replaced, first, by a massive increase of net foreign buying of US bonds by private buyers and, more recently, by a massive increase of net foreign buying of US equities. Indeed, for the first time, equity inflows have been the dominant source of current account deficit financing.
This change in the composition of net financial flows has fundamentally reshaped the composition of the stock of foreign holdings. Figure 3 illustrates this by plotting those holdings by financial instrument in constant 2026 dollars. The flattening of the pink line shows the “de-reservification” of US financial hegemony; the exploding blue line shows its “equityfication”. Since that is not a word, and should probably not become one, let’s stick with Tooze’s apt phrase of the “profit dollar”.
Europe, exposed
From the theoretical perspective elaborated in Braun et al. (2026), the institutions underpinning the exceptional performance of the US stock market—US-style shareholder primacy and the hyper-financialization of the US economy—reflect path-dependent developments in an economy that needs to sustain current account deficits year after year, for decades. The distributional consequences of profit-dollar hegemony are highly regressive. As rightly observed by Dominik Leusder, “what maintains the global dollar system is in fact precisely what is driving American decline from the inside out: an increasingly unequal domestic political economy characterized by rent extraction and high corporate profits.”
What about the creditors? It turns out that the shift in the US financing mix has come with a massive shift in the geographical footprint of US financial hegemony, and thus in the exposure. Data from the Treasury International Capital (TIC) System allows us to map those shifts in the geographical distribution of the United States’ creditors.
At the peak of the Bretton Woods 2.0 period, half of foreign-held Treasuries were held by China and Japan. Their share has since collapsed to just above 20 percent. (Note, however, that TIC data understates official Chinese buying because China has channeled a significant share of its purchases through custodians in the UK or Belgium—those holdings explain some of the increase in the UK and European shares.) For equities, the picture is dramatically different: Lumping Switzerland and Norway into an “EU plus” category and adding the UK and a small fraction of holdings registered in British Overseas Territories, Europe accounts for more than half of foreign holdings of US equities.
Can a US financing mix based on selling corporate stocks to yield-hungry—and, by implication, flighty—institutional capital pools and retail investors be anywhere near as stable as the previous arrangement of selling low-yielding government bonds to ultra-cautious official reserve managers? There are good reasons to have doubts.
Who is doing the most to prop up this latest iteration of US financial hegemony? Increasingly, that’s Europe. The European economy is highly exposed to the US economy in general, and to the US stock market in particular. Consider the case of Germany. In January 2025, ahead of winning the German elections and becoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz exhorted German companies that “the decision to invest in China is a decision involving great risk”. He issued his “heartfelt request to all companies” to limit their exposure to investment risk in China.
Now consider the facts. Figure 5 plots Germany’s bilateral international investment position with China and with the United States, in constant 2026 euros. One might be excused for thinking that perhaps, China is not the biggest source of investment risk here. Chancellor Merz and his colleagues across the EU would do well to warn European firms and households of the continent’s enormous exposure to a financial hegemon with the riskiest hegemonic financing mix on record.
References
Citation
@online{braun2026,
author = {Braun, Benjamin},
title = {Financial Hegemony, but with Stocks},
date = {2026-11-18},
url = {https://www.benjaminbraun.org/posts/us-iip/},
langid = {en}
}